Contingent capital in the form of debt that converts to equity when a bank faces financial distress has been proposed as a mechanism to enhance financial stability and avoid costly government rescues. Specific proposals vary in their choice of conversion trigger and conversion mechanism. We analyze the case of contingent capital with a capital-ratio trigger and partial and on-going conversion. The capital ratio we use is based on accounting or book values to approximate the regulatory ratios that determine capital requirements for banks. The conversion process is partial and on-going in the sense that each time a bank's capital ratio reaches the minimum threshold, just enough debt is converted to equity to meet the capital requirement, so long as the contingent capital has not been depleted. We derive closed-form expressions for the market value of such securities when the firm's assets are modeled as geometric Brownian motion, and these result in formulas for the fair yield spread on the convertible debt. A key step in the analysis is an explicit expression for the fraction of equity held by the original shareholders and the fraction held by converted investors in the contingent capital.
Introduction
Several proposals for enhancing the stability of the financial system include requirements that banks hold some form of contingent capital, meaning equity that becomes available to a bank in the event of a crisis or financial distress. Variants of this idea differ in the choice of trigger for the activation of contingent capital and in how the capital is held before a triggering event. The Dodd-Frank financial reform bill of 2010 calls for regulators to study the potential effectiveness of contingent capital, and specific definitions for triggering events are put forward in a recent consultative document issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [2] .
Flannery [5] proposed reverse convertible debentures -a form of debt that converts to equity if a bank's capital ratio falls below a threshold. His proposal uses a capital ratio based on the market value of the bank's equity and the book value of its debt. Flannery [6] updated the proposal and renamed the securities contingent capital certificates. Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein [9] proposed a "lock box" to hold bank funds that would be released in the event of a crisis; in this proposal, the trigger is a systemic event, and not a risk of bankruptcy at an individual institution. McDonald [13] and the Squam Lake Working Group [20] propose contingent capital with a trigger that depends on the health of both an individual bank and the banking system as a whole. The convertible securities designed by the U.S. Treasury for its Capital Assistance Program may be viewed as a type of contingent capital in which banks hold the option to convert preferred shares to common equity and find it advantageous to do so if their share price drops sufficiently low; this contract is studied in Glasserman and Wang [7] .
Alternative proposals for the design of contingent capital have led to work on valuation.
McDonald [13] prices contingent capital with a dual trigger through joint simulation of a bank's stock price and a market index. Pennacchi [15] compares several cases by simulation in a jumpdiffusion model of a bank's assets. Albul, Jaffee, and Tchitsyi [1] obtain closed-form pricing expressions under the assumption that all debt has infinite maturity and that the conversion trigger is defined by a threshold level of assets. Raviv [19] also uses an asset-level trigger and obtains closed-form expressions with finite-maturity debt. Sundaresan and Wang [21] show that setting the conversion trigger at a level of the stock price may result in multiple solutions or no solution for the market price of the stock and convertible debt, raising questions about the viability of contracts designed with market-based triggers. Among recent alternatives to the mechanisms considered in these papers, Duffie [4] proposes mandatory offering of new equity by banks facing financial distress, McAndrews [12] proposes a combination of a rights offering and convertible debt, and Pennacchi, Vermaelen, and Wolff [16] suggest bundling contingent capital with buyback options for equity holders.
We develop a model to study contingent capital in the form debt that converts to equity based on a capital-ratio trigger. The bank is required to hold a minimum ratio of equity to total assets (equivalently, it faces an upper bound on leverage); if its asset value drops too low, part of its debt converts to equity in order to maintain the required capital ratio. Our setting is thus similar to Flannery's [5, 6] , though he compares the market value of equity to the book value of debt.
Existing regulatory capital requirements for banks are based primarily on book values.
Under both Basel I and Basel II rules, banks must hold regulatory capital equal to at least 8% of their risk-weighted assets. U.S. banks also face an overall capital-to-assets constraint with a minimum of 3% and a threshold of 5% to qualify as "well capitalized." All of these ratios are based on regulatory accounting measures of debt and capital rather than the market price of a bank's stock. Existing issuances to date -the contingent core capital ("CoCo") bonds issued by Lloyd's Banking Group in November 2009 and mortgage lender Yorkshire Building Society in December 2009, and the principal write-down bonds issued by Rabobank in March 2010 -all use triggers based on regulatory capital ratios and not market prices. Flannery [5, 6] and Pennachi et al. [16] advocate the use of market data because it is continuously updated and forward-looking, while noting concerns that market values could potentially be manipulated to trigger conversion. The results of Sundaresan and Wang [21] show that defining an internally consistent market-based trigger can be problematic. As there are good arguments for both market-value and book-value triggers, both types of securities merit investigation; as the two require somewhat different analysis, here we limit ourselves to book-value capital ratios.
A distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we model partial and on-going conversion of contingent capital as a bank's capital ratio declines, consistent with Flannery's [5] original proposal. Flannery [5] also discusses how partial conversion might be implemented in practice.
Previous models have relied on the assumption that convertible debt is converted in its entirety as soon as a threshold is hit. Instead, we assume just enough conversion takes place to maintain the minimum capital ratio required, leading to a process of continuous conversion. This partial conversion process lends itself to a somewhat larger tranche of convertible debt than all-at-once conversion would, and it makes the full tranche truly contingent, with each layer converted only as needed. With all-at-once conversion, most of the debt is converted too early (or too late).
Partial conversion has important implications for investors: as contingent capital converts to equity, bond holders become shareholders and thus share in any costs or benefits to shareholders of subsequent conversion. We will show that increasing the minimum capital requirement has the effect of slowing conversion and thus shifts more of the dilution cost from conversion to investors who became shareholders through earlier conversion of debt. As a consequence, a higher capital ratio can actually benefit the original shareholders if the loss in asset value is sufficiently large; the value of the convertible debt need not be monotone in the required capital ratio.
We undertake our valuation in a structural model, starting from the firm's assets. The firm's capital structure is comprised of senior (unconvertible) debt, contingent capital, and equity.
Market values of debt and equity are determined, as usual, by viewing these as claims on the assets; but the book value of debt is calculated by discounting future coupon and principal payments at the yield at which the bond was issued, consistent with accounting rules. We use the resulting book values in our capital ratio. The market and book values of debt must agree at issuance and at maturity, and we incorporate this constraint in our analysis to fix the coupon rates. In our framework, investors in contingent capital hold claims on four types of payments: coupons on unconverted debt, the remaining principal on convertible debt, dividends earned through debt converted to equity, and the value of this equity at the maturity of the debt. We value the contingent capital as the sum of the values of these payments.
Once the contingent capital is exhausted, we assume that a failure to meet the minimum capital requirement results in a seizure and liquidation by regulators. Liquidation occurs prior to bankruptcy in the sense that a bank has positive equity when it first breaches its capital ratio. We incorporate potential liquidation costs for shareholders and also for bond holders in our valuation. Indeed, these costs have a significant impact on our valuations, as does asset volatility. Asset volatility affects both the likelihood of conversion of debt to equity and the upside potential of equity following conversion.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model of the firm and the conversion of debt to equity, and Section 3 examines how equity is allocated between converted shareholders and the original shareholders as the value of the firm's assets evolve.
Section 4 introduces dividends. Section 5 details the cashflows paid to investors in the firm's senior debt, contingent capital, and equity, and Section 6 presents explicit expressions for the values of these cashflows. Section 7 closes the model by solving for the coupons on the two types of debt to equate market and book values at issuance; from these we get the yield spread on contingent capital. Section 8 illustrates our results through numerical examples. Detailed calculations leading to our valuation formulas are deferred to appendices.
Model of the Firm
Our model of the firm (or bank) builds on a long line of research on capital structure that includes Merton [14] , Black and Cox [3] , Leland [10] , and numerous subsequent papers. This approach starts by modeling the dynamics of a firm's assets and then prices debt and equity as claims on those assets. In Merton [14] , the firm defaults at the maturity of the debt if its asset value is less than the face value of the debt. In Black and Cox [3] , bankruptcy occurs when asset value drops to an exogenous reorganization boundary, and in Leland [10] , the time of default is chosen strategically by shareholders. In our setting, we will need to provide a corresponding prescription for the conversion of contingent capital to equity, as well as specifying a trigger for liquidation of the firm. We interpret the liquidation event as resulting from seizure by regulators when the firm is unable to sustain its capital requirement which, by design, occurs prior to a traditional bankruptcy event. For our valuation formulas, we will limit ourselves to an asset value process modeled as geometric Brownian motion, but we postpone any assumptions on asset values until they are needed.
Debt
The firm issues ordinary senior debt as well as junior convertible debt. Both types of debt are issued at time zero and mature at time T > 0. The senior debt has a face or par value of D (due at time T ) and a continuous coupon rate of c 2 , meaning that it pays c 2 D per unit of time.
The debt is issued at a price of D 0 . From an accounting perspective, the effective interest rate for the debt is the discount rate d 2 that equates the cash raised (D 0 ) to the present value of future payments promised on the debt; i.e., the value of d 2 that solves
The book value of the debt at any intermediate date t, 0 < t < T , is then
if the firm has not yet failed. In other words, throughout the life of the debt, book value is calculated by discounting remaining payments at the effective interest rate at which the debt was originally issued.
In the absence of any other type of debt, we would model default as occurring the first time the value of the firm's assets fall below the boundary defined by D t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T . This is an instance of the mechanism used in Black and Cox [3] , though they use an exponential boundary, which corresponds to setting c 2 = 0. The boundary in Black and Cox [3] is often interpreted as a protective debt covenant, and that interpretation could be applied here. In the case of a regulated bank, which is our focus, the boundary will serve to define a minimum capital requirement the bank must maintain, rather than a privately negotiated covenant. The capital requirement will set the liquidation boundary higher (by the amount of the required capital buffer) than the default boundary (1). The bank is seized by regulators before bankruptcy if the capital requirement is not maintained.
Next we introduce convertible debt with a face value of B, a continuous coupon rate c 1 , and maturity T , issued at time zero at a price of B 0 . The assumption that all of the debt has the same maturity T is a simplifying idealization. The effective interest rate d 1 equates B 0 to the present value of the promised payments of coupon and principal,
As part of the original contingent capital issuance converts to equity, the remaining principal decreases, but we apply the same effective interest rate d 1 to calculate the book value of the debt outstanding. If the remaining principal at time t isB t , then the book value at time t is
We take up the conversion mechanism that determinesB t in the next subsection.
Equations (1) and (2) 
Conversion From Debt to Equity
We denote by V t the value of the firm's assets at time t. Subtracting the firm's debt from its assets at time t leaves
we refer to Q t as capital, shareholder's equity, or simply equity, but it should interpreted as a book value or regulatory measure and not as the market value of equity, because (1) and (2) are accounting based measures of debt. Indeed, the goal of our analysis is to calculate market values based on the contractual terms of the contingent capital.
The firm is required to maintain a capital ratio of at least α, 0 < α < 1, which imposes the
For example, to model a bank that is required to hold capital equal to 8% of assets, we would set α = 0.08. As V fluctuates, a bank could be in danger of violating this requirement; the contingent capital converts from debt to equity (decreasing B t and increasing Q t ) to maintain the constraint as long as possible. Flannery [5] introduced this mechanism using the market value of equity, rather than regulatory capital, to drive conversion. We will assume that V has continuous paths, and we will derive the process of minimal conversion under which conversion takes place precisely at those times t at which Q t = αV t ; i.e., times at which (1−α)V t = B t +D t .
We will assume throughout that the bank is initially well capitalized in the sense that Q 0 > αV 0 .
In terms of the amountB t of principal remaining (not converted) at time t, the capital constraint is
Once the contingent capital is exhausted, the constraint becomes
Then we show below that (1 − α)L t is the cumulative amount of principal converted up to time t. More precisely, we claim that if we setB (4) is satisfied for all t ∈ [0, τ b ], and (1 − α)L t is the least amount of conversion that meets this condition.
Equation (5) 
The conversion process in this case becomes easier to visualize if we introduce two thresholds
Under our standing assumption that the capital constraint is satisfied at time zero, V 0 > a.
Conversion starts when V first hits a. Subsequently, at each instant at which V hits a level lower than any previously reached, additional contingent capital is converted to satisfy the constraint.
Once V hits b (which happens at τ b ), the contingent capital has been fully converted. See Figure 1 . The process L is given by
The width a − b is (1 − α) times the face value B of contingent capital.
A similarly tractable case holds when the two types of debt pay no coupon and have the same effective interest rate -that is, when c 1 = c 2 = 0 and
becomes
This reduces to (8) if we simply replace the original asset value process V t with the new process e −d(T −t) V t , which amounts to an adjustment in the drift when V t is modeled as geometric Brownian motion. Thus, in analyzing the case in (8) we include (9) as well. However, the case in (9) is of less interest because if the debt pays no coupon we would expect that the convertible debt and the senior debt would have different effective interest rates.
We formalize the conversion mechanism in the following result, in which we view (5) 
(iii) L increases only when equality holds in (ii).
Any function satisfying (i) and (ii) is greater than or equal to
Condition (i) is natural for the process of cumulative conversion. Condition (ii) states that conversion occurs to preserve the required capital ratio until τ b when the contingent capital is exhausted. Condition (iii) states that conversion occurs only as needed -when the firm is at its minimum capital requirement. The result follows from the standard reflection mapping (as in Harrison [8, p.21] ) applied to the function
The proposition determines L only up to the time τ b when the contingent capital has been fully converted. Using (5) 
Equity Allocation
We will value the contingent capital bond by calculating the expected present value of the payments to the holder of the security. The payments include coupons (paid continuously in proportion to the unconverted debt), any remaining principal at maturity, a fraction of the firm's equity earned through conversion, and dividends paid on a fraction of equity. From the analysis in the previous section, we can determine how much of the contingent capital remains unconverted at each point in time. To value the equity component as the bond converts, we
need to analyze what fraction of the firm's equity is held by investors who were converted from contingent capital holders to equity holders.
We limit ourselves to the case c 1 = d 1 and c 2 = d 2 which, as explained in the previous section, equates book value to remaining face value for both kinds of debt. We introduce a conversion ratio q > 0, which is the number of dollars of equity given to the contingent capital investors upon the conversion of one dollar of face value of convertible debt. The conversion process can then be described as follows. (See also Figures 2-3.) Suppose the firm is just at the capital ratio boundary so Q t = αV t and consider a drop of ∆ > 0 in asset value.
• The drop in asset value causes an immediate reduction by an equal amount ∆ in equity value, violating the required capital ratio of α.
• This causes conversion of an amount (1 − α)∆ of debt into equity.
• The net change in equity is the difference between the increase (1 − α)∆ from conversion and the decrease ∆ from the initial loss, for a net reduction of α∆. The resulting capital ratio is thus (Q t − α∆)/(V t − ∆) = α, as required.
• In exchange for giving up an amount (1 − α)∆ of face value of debt, the holders of the converted debt receive an amount q(1 − α)∆ of the firm's equity.
We have outlined these steps as happening sequentially, but in our model they happen simultaneously. The loss of ∆ in asset value instantaneously triggers conversion of the amount (1 − α)∆ of debt to equity, consistent with (8) . Observe that the conversion ratio q has no effect on the firm's overall capital structure or on its ability to maintain the minimum capital
Balance sheet illustration of the conversion process. If the firm is at the minimum capital ratio, a drop ∆ in asset value results in conversion of (1 − α)∆ of debt to equity.
At the conversion of (1 − α)∆ of debt into equity, contingent capital holders get q(1 − α)∆ in equity -the shaded area in the figure, which shows the case q > 1. This requires a transfer of (q − 1)(1 − α)∆ from prior shareholders to newly converted shareholders.
requirement -the conversion ratio merely affects the allocation of equity. At q = 1, converted investors receive an amount of equity exactly equal to what they lose in debt, so there is no transfer of wealth between the prior and new equity holders; but for any q = 1, an amount (q − 1)(1 − α)∆ is in effect transferred from the prior equity holders to the newly converted equity holders. (These expressions should be understood as holding for all sufficiently small ∆ so that the amount transferred does not exceed the available equity; this is not a concern in the continuous-time formulation because we assume V has continuous paths.) As a practical matter, the transfer would be effected through the number of shares issued at conversion: increasing the number of new shares dilutes prior shareholders and reduces their share of equity.
We will derive an expression for the amount of equity held at any time by the original equity investors. To motivate the derivation, we consider a discrete-time formulation with a discrete transition over a small interval ∆t and write V t+∆t = V t + ∆V t . Suppose, as above, that the firm is just at the capital ratio boundary at time t, and suppose ∆V t < 0. From (8) (and Proposition 2.1), we know that L increases when V reaches a new minimum and ∆L t = −∆V t .
The resulting amount of equity following conversion is given by
the minimal amount of additional equity required to preserve the capital ratio.
Let Q o denote the amount of equity held by the original shareholders, and let π t = Q o t /Q t denote the fraction of equity they own. Suppose the conversion at time t is the first to occur, so that the equity is fully held by the original shareholders just before conversion and
In other words, the original shareholders absorb the full loss ∆V t in asset value, and they lose an amount (q − 1)(1 − α)∆L t to the new shareholders as a result of the conversion. More generally, if the original shareholders own a fraction π t of the equity at time t, then they absorb a fraction π t of the losses, and we have
This discussion of the discrete-time case is for motivation only. To formulate a precise result, we work directly in continuous time. At this stage, we can keep the model very general and allow V to be any continuous semimartingale (as in Protter [18] , p.44 and p.114); we will specialize to the case of geometric Brownian motion for our most explicit results, and that case is encompassed in this analysis.
We defined Q t in (3). Under our constant book-value condition
and the expression
is well-defined because V is a semimartingale and L has increasing paths. We introduce the process Q o by setting
with initial condition Q o 0 = Q 0 . We interpret Q o as the equity held by the original shareholders: equation (12) says that the change in their equity is their share of the change in asset value plus their share of the transfer to new shareholders upon conversion. Using (11) to write this
offers the following interpretation: the return to the original shareholders dQ o t /Q o t equals the return dQ t /Q t to all shareholders so long as no conversion occurs; at an instant of conversion, the return to the original shareholders is reduced by the fraction of equity transferred to the new shareholders. ("Returns" must here be understood in terms of book values.) Because
so the fraction Q 0 t /Q t does not change in [τ b , T ]. The following result confirms that these definitions are meaningful and that they lead to an explicit solution. (13) and (14) have exactly one solution, and it is given by
Consequently, the fraction of equity held by the original shareholders at time t is given by
A remarkable feature of (16) is that the fraction of equity held by the original shareholders at any time t depends only on the minimum asset value reached up to time t. Different paths of V may produce very different paths for the conversion process and may result in different terminal values for equity; and yet, if they reach the same minimum asset value, they leave the original shareholders owning the same fraction of the firm. The total amount of contingent capital converted to time t is (1 − α)L t , and it is interesting that the dependence of π t on this amount is nonlinear yet explicit.
The explicit and succinct dependence in (16) is specific to the continuous-time setting and, indeed, is one of the main advantages of working with continuous conversion. In discrete time, with a time step of size ∆t, (10) yields the following recursive expression for the fraction π whenever ∆L t = 0 and thus conversion occurs:
equity at t − loss in assets
If ∆L t = 0, then no conversion occurs and π t remains unchanged. By noting that V t = a − L t , we can write this expression as
Thus, in discrete time π t is given by a product of such terms and depends on all the increments ∆L t and not just the cumulative level L t .
Returning to the continuous-time setting, we note some properties of (16) . If L t = 0 (i.e., if 
it is decreasing in α if the opposite inequality holds.
This result is easily established by differentiating the third expression for π t given in (16) .
We interpret the corollary as stating, perhaps surprisingly, that a higher required capital ratio ultimately protects the original shareholders: if the loss in asset value is sufficiently large, the original shareholders keep a higher fraction of the firm under a higher (and thus more stringent) capital ratio α.
To interpret the condition in the corollary, recall that conversion of debt to equity begins when asset value reaches a = (B + D)/(1 − α). For small α, exp(−α) ≈ 1, so the threshold in (19) is nearly the same as the trigger for conversion. Thus, at higher α, conversion is triggered sooner (resulting in a lower π), but if asset value continues to decline, a higher α results in a higher fraction of equity held by the original shareholders.
This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 4 
Dividends and Debt Service Payments
As is standard in much of the capital structure literature (e.g., Leland and Toft [11] ), we will assume that the firm's assets generate cash at a rate proportional to their value, and these cashflows are used to service the firm's debt and to pay dividends to shareholders. If the firm pays out a constant fraction δ ∈ (0, 1) of its asset value, then from time t to t + dt, the cashflow available will be δV t dt.
With a coupon rate of c 2 and a face value of D, the senior debt requires payments at rate c 2 D prior to maturity. Interest on debt is tax deductible, and we model this as in, e.g., Leland [10] and Leland and Toft [11] : if the firm's marginal tax rate is κ ∈ (0, 1), it incurs an after-tax cost rate of (1 − κ)c 2 D in servicing the senior debt. We could apply different marginal tax rates κ 1 , κ 2 to the two types of debt 1 to get after-tax coupon rates (1 − κ i )c i , i = 1, 2; for simplicity, we use a common value κ. The outstanding convertible debt at time t is B −(1−α)L t , requiring an after-tax payment at rate
The difference
between the rate at which cash is generated and the rate at which it is paid to debt holders 1 It is unclear if coupons on contingent capital would be tax deductible under the current tax code in the U.S. because the conversion feature may make the debt too equity-like. This possibility could be modeled by taking κ1 = 0. But tax rules could also be changed if regulators sought to create incentives for banks to hold more of their debt in the form of contingent capital.
is the rate at which dividends are paid to shareholders, whenever this difference is positive.
When the difference is negative, the firm is generating insufficient cash to service its debt. As is customary, we interpret a negative dividend as the issuance of a small amount of new equity, which brings cash into the firm. This cash is immediately paid out to the debt holders, so the issuance has no impact on the total amount of capital in the firm.
We will assume, in fact, that the new equity is issued to existing shareholders (as in a rights offering) and that the original and converted shareholders participate in equal proportions.
Thus, the proportion π t of the firm owned by the original shareholders is unchanged. The new shareholders then receive a net cashflow at rate
regardless of whether this is positive (in which case it is a dividend) or negative (in which case it is the cost of raising equity). We will need to incorporate this stream of payments into our overall valuation of the contingent capital.
Two parameter ranges for the coupon and payout rates merit special mention. We know that as long as the firm has not exhausted its convertible debt, it can maintain the minimum capital ratio by converting debt into equity; that is, it can maintain the bound
with equality holding at the instants of conversion. It follows that, if
the firm always generates enough cash to service its debt, and shareholders always earn a dividend. In contrast, if
then the firm will stop paying a dividend -and will start issuing small amounts of equityin advance of any debt converting to equity.
Decomposition of Payments on Convertible and Senior Debt
In this section, we decompose the payments to holders of the convertible debt into a principal payment, coupon payments, dividends on converted equity and a terminal equity payment. We decompose payments on the senior debt contingent on the firm's ability to maintain the required capital ratio. These decompositions prepare the way for the valuations in the next section.
The horizon for the valuation is the smaller of the debt maturity T and the time τ b at which V first hits b = D/(1−α). At τ b , the firm has exhausted its contingent capital and can no longer sustain the required capital ratio; as before, we assume the firm is then seized by regulators and liquidated. The firm still has equity at this point, but not enough to meet the capital requirement. To capture the possible loss in value from seizure, we assume that shareholders recover a fraction R 1 ∈ [0, 1] of the equity value at τ b , the remaining fraction 1−R 1 representing a deadweight cost. (An alternative loss mechanism is the delayed recapitalization used in Peura and Keppo [17] .) Similarly, we apply a recovery rate of R 2 ∈ [0, 1] to senior debt. Absolute priority of debt over equity would require that R 1 = 0 if R 2 < 1, but we do not limit ourselves to this case, particularly because the impact of regulatory action in the event of insufficient capital is likely to be more complex than a simple liquidation and allocation of value. We thus leave open the possibility that senior debt holders incur a loss upon seizure while some equity remains in the firm.
We use r > 0 to denote a fixed interest rate (typically a risk-free rate) at which to discount all payoffs for valuation.
Convertible Debt
The discounted payoffs of the components of the convertible debt are as follows:
• principal payment at maturity:
• earned coupon:
• equity earned through conversion:
• net dividends:
In (21), (1 − α)L T is the total amount of debt converted to equity, so B − (1 − α)L T is the remaining principal at maturity. Similarly, in (22), B − (1 − α)L s is the remaining principal at time s, and multiplying this expression by c 1 yields the rate at which the holders of the bond earn coupons. Equation (23) breaks down the claim on equity into two parts, depending on whether liquidation occurs before the maturity of the debt. In the first term, τ b > T so the firm survives throughout the interval [0, T ]. The total value of the firm's equity at T is the difference
between the value of the firm's assets and the principal payments on the two kinds of debt. A fraction (1 − π T ) of the equity goes to the new shareholders -those who acquired an equity stake through conversion of the contingent capital. In the second case in (23), the firm is seized and liquidated at time τ b when the contingent capital is exhausted. At this instant, the firm just meets its capital requirement, so the remaining equity is αV τ b . A fraction R 1 of this is recovered by shareholders upon liquidation, and a fraction (1 − π τ b ) of the recovered equity goes to the new shareholders.
Finally, the integrand in (24) is the discounted value of the net dividend rate in (20) paid to the converted shareholders at time t. To value the contingent capital, we will need to calculate the expectations of (21)- (24) under a stochastic model of the firm's asset value V .
Senior Debt
The payments on the senior debt can be decomposed similarly but more simply into principal and coupon payments. We again distinguish the cases τ b ≤ T and τ b > T , the first case corresponding to seizure and liquidation of the firm. The discounted payoffs to senior debtholders are as follows:
• earned coupon
• principal:
In equation (25), coupons are paid until either the maturity of the debt at time T or the liquidation at τ b . In (26), the principal payment is reduced from the original face value of D to R 2 D in the case of liquidation, reflecting a recovery rate of R 2 for the senior debt and the possibility of a deadweight cost of seizure and liquidation. If R 2 = 1, the senior debt would be entirely riskless
Valuation
To this point, we have assumed almost nothing about the evolution of asset value beyond continuity. To calculate expectations of (21)- (26), we specialize to the case of geometric Brownian motion and posit that the dynamics of the value of the firm's assets are given by
where W is a standard Brownian motion, and δ is, as before, the constant fraction of value paid out to security holders. Equivalently, we have
where
In writing the drift in (27) as r − δ, we are implicitly specifying the dynamics of V under a risk-neutral pricing measure that we will use to take expectations in (21)- (25). Mathematically, this is by no means necessary -we could use any constant drift, including one that incorporates a risk premium. We are, however, implicitly assuming that the firm holds traded assets and that they are carried at their market values. This would be an implausible assumption for a firm with significant investment in factories and equipment. It is a more reasonable approximation to reality for a financial institution, particularly one applying mark-to-market accounting to its assets.
A Partial Transform
Inspection of the discounted payoffs in (21)-(25) and the probability π t in (16) indicates that the key remaining step for valuation is taking expectations involving powers of V and its running minimum with the running minimum restricted to an interval. We therefore undertake a preliminary calculation of a general such expression which we will then use to value the various payments.
then W is a Brownian motion with drift µ and diffusion coefficient σ. Let
The function H depends on the parameters µ and σ through the processes W and m; as these parameters remain fixed throughout the paper, we suppress this dependence and write simply H(t, v, k, y) in referring to the function. The function is given explicitly in the following result.
Proposition 6.1 The function H in (30) evaluates to
with h(t, k, y) = 2θ 2θ + kσ 2 e ky+2yθ/σ 2 Φ y + tθ σ
where θ = µ + vσ 2 , and Φ is the standard normal distribution function.
With y = 0, (30) defines the joint Laplace transform of W t and − m t , and in this sense the general case in (30) defines a partial transform. In our application of the formula, y will always take the value log(a/V 0 ) or log(b/V 0 ), corresponding to the asset levels at which conversion of contingent capital starts and ends. In several cases, we need to take the difference of values of H at these two values of y with other arguments held fixed, so it will be convenient to define
.
Principal and Coupon Payments
The discounted expected value of the principal payment on the convertible debt is the expected value of equation (21) and is given by
Thus, to value the principal payment it suffices to find the expectation of L T .
Proposition 6.2
The expected present value of the contingent capital's principal payment is (34), where
This expression evaluates to The expected present value of the coupon payments (22) on the contingent capital is given
We do not have a simple expression for the integral in (36); however, because E[L t ] is smooth and monotone, the integral can be accurately approximated by replacing it with a sum.
Equity Earned Through Conversion
We turn now to (23), which gives the discounted terminal value of the equity acquired by the contingent capital investors through the process of conversion. We value separately the two terms in (23), the first corresponding to the firm surviving until T , the second corresponding to seizure and liquidation before T .
Proposition 6.3
The value of the converted equity stake in the event of survival (the first term in (23)) is given by exp(−rT ) times
In the event of seizure and liquidation (the second term in (23)), the value of the converted equity stake is
where θ 1 = µ 2 + 2σ 2 r. The value of the converted equity stake is the sum of the two terms.
Net Dividends
As discussed in Section 4, the difference between the total payout rate δV t and debt service payments creates a dividend stream for equity holders, a fraction 1 − π t of which flows to investors who originally held convertible debt, as in (24). Taking the expected value of this expression, we get
The expectation inside the integral can be evaluated in closed form:
Proposition 6.4 The expected net rate at which the contingent capital investors earn dividends (i.e., the expectation on the right side of (39)) is given by
The present value of the cumulative dividends is the time-integral of this expression, which is easily and accurately approximated by a sum over a discrete set of dates.
It is also evident from this expression that the effect of the marginal tax rate κ is simply to replace each original coupon rate c i with (1 − κ)c i . The formula remains valid if we replace (1 − κ)c i with (1 − κ i )c i to allow different levels of tax-deductibility of the two types of coupons.
Senior Debt
The expected value of the coupon payments (25) is given by
Similarly, the discounted expected value of the principal payment (26) is given by
The probability P(τ b > T ) coincides with P( m T > log(b/V 0 )), which can be evaluated directly using equation (44) in the appendix; the expectation
explicitly in equation (48) of the appendix. With these substitutions, the total discounted expected value of the senior debt becomes
where, as before, θ 1 is the square root of 2σ 2 r + µ 2 . The following result values the senior debt using the function H:
Proposition 6.5 The value of the senior debt, including both coupon payments (25) and principal (26), is given by
with θ 1 = 2σ 2 r + µ.
Closing the Model: Market Yields
In our calculations, we have assumed that both the senior debt and the convertible debt are sold at par at time zero; this leads to constant book values (for the unconverted principal), (8) , and the resulting tractability. In Section 6, we have calculated market prices for senior and convertible debt, with coupon rates assumed given. For our model to be internally consistent,
we need the market prices we calculate at time zero to coincide with our assumption that the bonds sell at par. We now show that this is indeed possible and that it determines the coupon rates for both types of debt.
For the senior debt, equating the expected discounted value of the coupon and principal calculated in Section 6.5 to the face value D yields the coupon rate
The probability and expectation in this expression are evaluated in Appendix C.4, thus allowing direct evaluation of c 2 . If R 2 = 1, the coupon rate c 2 reduces to r: under our assumption that the firm is seized and liquidated when it violates its capital requirement -before insolvency -the senior debt is riskless if there is no loss of value at liquidation.
Similarly, for the convertible debt, equating our valuation (the sum of the expectations of (21)- (24))) with the face value B yields the coupon rate
where A 1 is the expected principal in (34),
from (36), A 3 is the expected terminal equity value (the sum of (38) and exp(−rT ) times (37)), and
come from the net dividends in (39). The results in Section 6 yield explicit expressions for A 1 -A 5 and thus for the coupon rate c 1 .
We view these expressions as the key practical contribution of our analysis. Given the characteristics of the firm -its asset volatility and the face value of its senior and convertible debt -these equations give the coupon rates required by the market. For debt issued at par, the coupon rate equals the yield; so, more generally, we interpret these rates as the yields required by the market for the two types of debt. These equations are therefore useful in gauging the yield required by investors in contingent capital as compensation for bearing the risk that the debt they hold converts to equity.
Example
In this section, we use numerical examples to investigate how the yields derived from our model change with parameter inputs and how the introduction of convertible debt influences the spread on senior debt. Table 1 shows the parameter values we use. The first set (I) is our base case and is intended to be representative of the end of 2006, before the financial crisis, based on data for the twenty largest (by assets) banks in the U.S. The parameter modifications indicated under II are intended to be representative of 2009. In both cases, we consider a bank with 90% debt that is required to maintain a minimum capital ratio of 4% of assets. The maturity T approximates the weighted average maturity of debt for large banks, using a six-month maturity for deposits.
The base case has a relatively low asset volatility of 8%, a payout rate of 3% (reflecting both interest payments and dividends) and a risk-free rate of 5%, which is very close to the average Treasury rate at the end of 2006, when the Treasury yield curve was quite flat.
We begin with nonconvertible debt only. Recall that the coupon rate is set to price the bond at par, so the coupon and yield are equal. Figure 6a shows the yield spreads we obtain with our assumed recovery rate R 2 of 95%. With a 100% recovery rate, the debt would be riskless. The potential loss of 5% takes effect only in case of seizure by regulators; this occurs at a positive capital ratio, when the bank's assets still exceed the value of its debt, so the loss reflects a liquidation cost. Our base case of α = 4% and σ = 8% produces a spread of 1.9%.
As expected, the figure shows that the spread increases if we increase α or σ, as each of these changes increases the likelihood of seizure and thus of a loss from liquidation. Figure 6b illustrates the effect of introducing convertible debt to the balance sheet. The total amount of debt (regular debt and convertible debt) is fixed at 90% of total asset value.
We change the proportion of convertible debt from 0% to 10% of the total debt. The graph shows the required coupon rates for both the senior and the convertible debt. The coupon rate on the convertible debt depends on the loss incurred by shareholders at seizure and liquidation;
we assume a 60% recovery rate, meaning that 40% of the remaining equity value at seizure is lost through liquidation.
The first observation is that the coupon rate on the senior debt decreases when the proportion of convertible debt increases. The contingent capital works as a cushion against liquidation; therefore, with the same recovery rate, the senior debt suffers lower liquidation costs because of the reduced likelihood of seizure, and this translates to a lower compensating coupon rate.
With only a small amount of convertible debt, the required coupon on this debt is extremely high, and this can be understood as follows. With a thin layer of convertible debt on the balance sheet, the probability of liquidation does not change much, and if the asset level hits the conversion trigger it is very likely that the full layer of contingent capital will be converted and the liquidation boundary will be reached, leaving little chance for the converted investors to benefit from the potential upside to equity. Indeed, they are likely to incur the 40% liquidation cost to equity shortly after conversion.
However, the coupon rate decreases quickly as we thicken the layer of convertible debt.
Indeed, in this example, when convertible debt makes up more than 6% of the total debt it earns a lower coupon than the senior debt; and at more than 7% of the total debt, its coupon drops below the risk-free rate. This pattern results from the potential upside of the equity the contingent capital investors earn through conversion. Indeed, conversion occurs precisely when the book value of equity is low, so, conditional on survival, the contingent capital investors can benefit substantially from an increase in equity value, even with the conversion ratio of q = 1 which we use in our example. Increasing the proportion of contingent capital widens the interval between the conversion trigger and the liquidation trigger and increases the likelihood of an upside gain through conversion to equity. has an adverse effect on debt and a favorable effect on equity. What we observe in Figure 7b is the trade-off between these two effects.
Next we consider parameter set II of Table 1 , based roughly on conditions in 2009. Volatility is much higher, the risk-free rate is much lower, and we have cut the payout rate δ to reflect lower dividend rates. Figure 8 shows the resulting coupon rate on senior and convertible debt, and it shows that in these new market conditions, the fair coupon rate on the convertible debt is dramatically higher. Indeed, with these parameters, the geometric Brownian motion that models assets has a negative risk-neutral drift (r − δ − σ 2 /2 = −0.0228) and a high volatility, implying a higher chance of liquidation. As the debt sells at par, higher liquidation probabilities must be compensated with higher coupon rates. Increasing the size of the convertible debt decreases the required coupon rate; but, in contrast to the previous parameter set, even at 10% convertible debt we observe very high coupon rates. We see this as reflecting the necessity of issuing contingent capital in advance of a crisis; in an environment of high volatility, investors will demand a much higher coupon unless the overall level of leverage is substantially reduced.
The problem is diminished with a wider tranche of contingent capital, which provides a buffer for the senior debt and yields for the convertible debt in the range of 5-10%.
Summary
We have developed a model to value contingent capital in the form of debt that converts to equity. The key distinguishing features of our analysis are that we formulate a capital-ratio trigger and we model partial and on-going conversion. Our capital-ratio trigger approximates a regulatory capital requirement by using book values for debt and equity. Our partial conversion process allows just enough debt to convert to equity to maintain the required ratio until the contingent capital is fully exhausted. We derive closed-form expressions for the yield spreads on senior and convertible debt by adding a consistency requirement that market and book values agree at issuance and at maturity.
is an increasing process, we may take the differential of (15) 
From part (iii) of Proposition 2.1, we know that if t is a point of increase (in the sense of
Harrison [8] , p.xvii) of L, then
in other words, Q t = αV t . This expression also gives
Thus, we have
Making this substitution in (43) and rearranging terms, we get (13) . If τ b < T , then for t ∈ (τ b , T ], we have L t = L τ b and (15) is consistent with (14) . Thus, Q o in (15) solves (13)- (14) .
To prove uniqueness, we use Theorem 6 on p.194 of Protter [18] , for which we rewrite The expressions in (16) for π follow directly from (13) and the definition π t = Q o t /Q t , and this concludes the proof.
As a side note, we observe that from the discrete-time recursion (17) , one might naturally conjecture that dπ t π t = −q 1 − α α dL t a − L t , which would yield
It is easy to see that the first expression in (16) is indeed the solution to this equation.
Adding the two terms and then taking the difference between the values at m = y and m = −∞ yields h µ (t, k, y) = 2µ 2µ + kσ 2 e ky+2yµ/σ 2 Φ y + tµ σ √ t + 2µ + 2kσ 2 2µ + kσ 2 e kµt+k 2 σ 2 t/2 Φ y − (µ + kσ 2 )t σ √ t .
We can now evaluate H. By the Girsanov theorem, E e v f Wt+k e mt 1{ m t ≤ y} = e vµt+v 2 σ 2 t E θ e k e mt 1{ m t ≤ y} , the subscript θ indicating that the expectation is taken with the drift of W equal to θ = µ + vσ 2 rather than µ. The remaining expectation is given by h(t, k, y) = h θ (t, k, y), which is h µ (t, k, y)
with µ replaced by θ, as in (32).
where E θ indicates expectation with the drift of W changed to θ. This identity holds for any real θ; if we choose θ = θ 1 , with θ 1 = 2σ 2 r + µ 2 , then, recalling that W τ b = log(b/V 0 ), the expectation in (46) becomes
Observing that P θ 1 (τ b ≤ T ) = P θ 1 ( m T ≤ log(b/V 0 )) and applying formula (44) with m replaced by log(b/V 0 ) and µ replaced by θ 1 , it follows that (47) is equal to
Thus we have shown that
A further application of the Girsanov theorem yields
and thus the expression in (38).
Next we turn to (37). On the event that the firm survives until the debt matures, the present value of the equity held by the contingent capital investors is given by the first term By expanding the product and taking the expectation we get four terms, each of the type that defines the function ∆H, and this yields (37).
C.3 Proposition 6.4
If m t ≤ log(b/V 0 ), then τ b ≤ t and if m t > log(a/V 0 ), then π t = 1. In addition for m t in the interval [log(b/V 0 ), log(a/V 0 )], L t and π t are respectively equal to a−V 0 e e mt and (V 0 e e mt /a) 
